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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of financial market imperfections on a firm’s operating and
exporting decisions. I introduce financial frictions into a trade model with heterogeneous firms
along the line of Melitz (2003). With the presence of financial constraints, even among a group
of firms with the same productivity level, firms that are more financially constrained operate on
a less efficient scale, and as a result, may no longer find operating and/or exporting profitable.
In addition, financial frictions may create a distortion compared to the Melitz (2003) world since
operation and export participation may be undertaken by those with better access to finance
than by those with higher productivity. Furthermore, financial frictions can have persistent
effects on firms’ dynamics. Productive firms with very low starting net worth will never ac-
cumulate enough to overcome credit constraints and, therefore, will never start operating and,
subsequently, never export even if they are very productive. Using data from the World Bank
Enterprise Surveys for Brazil and Chile, I find evidence that supports the model’s prediction
that exporters are likely those that are less financially constrained even after controlling for
productivity and sectoral effects.
JEL Classifications: F10, F12, F14, F36, G20, G32. Keywords: financial frictions, borrowing
constraints, firm heterogeneity, export participation
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1 Introduction
Does finance matter for export participation? Although the importance of financing constraints
has been well documented on the determinants of firm dynamics,1 it has been shown only recently,
and with much more limited data, that a similar conclusion holds for firm export participation
decisions.2 This may be due to the fact that international trading imposes additional costs on
firms. As has been documented by much empirical literature, besides costs due to customs and
trade regulations, firms also face other fixed and sunk costs such as the costs of acquiring information
about the market conditions abroad or establishing distribution channels.3 Thus, natuarally firms’
ability to finance these costs may play an important role in the firms’ export decisions and that
more developed financial markets will be able to better provide firms with financing, reducing the
reliance of firms on internal funds to pay the costs involved in international trade.4
In this paper, I investigate one possible channel through which financial frictions affect firms’
export participation decisions using a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms along
the line of Melitz (2003).5 However, departing from the norm of this type of international trade
models with labor as the only input of production, I allow for capital as the only input, since with
this setup, the analysis of the effects of financial frictions on firms’ export decisions and dynamics
is much simpler. In particular, the model features monopolistically competitive firms facing credit
market frictions in raising capital necessary for production and financing fixed costs of exporting.
Thus, the financial frictions directly affect the firms’ level of production and dynamics by limiting
the size of the projects that firms can finance and the amount of net worth they can accumulate.
Therefore, in this model, firms are heterogeneous not only in the productivity level, as in the
standard model, but also in the amount of net worth they have accumulated. Assuming that the
amount of debt a firm can obtain is directly proportional to its net worth, the firm’s output level
and the decision whether to export will, therefore, not only depend on its productivity level, but
also on its net worth.
The model predicts that credit constraints influence firms’ selection into export markets: in
order for a firm to profit from exporting, it must not only have high enough productivity but also
a high enough level of net worth accumulation. Firms with low productivity and a low level of net
worth will be more profitable by serving only the domestic market. Firms with higher net worth will
find exporting more attractive. In addition, due to the general equilibrium effect, credit market
frictions may create a distortionary effect: namely, export participation is undertaken by those
firms with better access to finance than by those with higher productivity. Using the World Bank
Enterprise Surveys for Brazil and Chile, I provide evidence complementary to the earlier literature
and supporting the model’s predictions that the firms’ financial position is positively related to the
propensity to export and exporting firms are less financially constrained.
1Cooley and Quadrini (2001), for example, introduce financial frictions into a model of industry dynamics and
show that the model can account for the simultaneous dependence of firm dynamics on size, age, and financial
characteristics of the firms.
2Greenaway et al. (2007) find that U.K. firms that are less financially constrained are more likely to export, and
balance sheet variables are important determinants of firms’ exporting decisions. Campa and Shaver (2002) find that
liquidity constraints are less binding for exporters than for non-exporters for Spanish firms. Zia (2005) measures the
effects of export subsidies on firms in Pakistan and identifies the privately owned firms as being financially constrained,
and, thus, suggests that export credit subsidies should primarily be targeted to small, privately owned firms.
3Roberts and Tybout (1999) and Bernard and Jensen (2001), for example, have emphasized the sunk costs of
exporting.
4Manova (2008b) finds that firms face credit constraints in the financing of both fixed and variable export costs.
5Melitz (2003) highlights the role of firm productivity in explaining a firm’s participation in exporting.
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The model also features the property that financial frictions can have persistent effects on firms’
entry decisions.6 In particular, productive firms with very low starting net worth may not choose to
save to overcome credit constraints and, therefore, will never start operating and/or exporting even
if they are very productive. This differs from the usual view that firms can always save their way
out of the borrowing constraints. Thus, this result seems to support the usual arguments justifying
policies in favor of small enterprises since, in the presence of financial market imperfections, those
that are viable in the long run may fail to enter as they do not have funds to cover the costs in the
early years.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on financial constraints and export participa-
tion. Prior researchers, however, have only augmented the Melitz (2003) model with an additional
dimension of firm heterogeneity that is exogenously given. Chaney (2005), for example, focuses on
liquidity-constrained exporting firms, assuming that firms inherit an exogenous amount of liquidity
while Manova (2008b) assumes that firms can only partially finance fixed cost of trade internally
with this fraction differs exogenously across firms. Garcia-Vega and Guariglia (2007) analyze the
effects of firms’ exogenous income shocks on their probability of survival and their decisions to
enter export markets. In addition, since in these studies, financial frictions affect entry and export
decisions directly by lowering firms’ profits, not through the change in the firms’ production level,
the firms’ selection into the domestic and foreign markets in these models only reinforces that of
the Melitz (2003) model. In my model, on the contrary, this selection may be weakened leading to
the distortion that less productive firms with better access to finance may operate and/or export
instead of those more productive firms that are financially constrained.
This paper is also related to the literature on financial institutions and the theory of com-
parative advantage.7 This line of research finds robust evidence that countries that are financially
developed tend to have comparative advantage and export more in financially dependent sectors,
usually defined as sectors that rely more on external finance or have less collateralizable assets. Sim-
ilarly, my model can be used to analyze the effects of financial frictions on firm dynamics within
each sector which give rise to the country’s comparative advantage and pattern of international
trade.
I begin by presenting the evidence on the positive relation between the firms’ financial positions
and export behaviors. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 develops a model
of financial frictions and firms’ decision to export. Section 4 contains the characterizations of an
equilibrium of the model. Illustrative numerical examples of the model are presented in Section 5,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
Using the data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Brazil (2003) and Chile (2004),8 I find
that in line with the prediction of the model, the financial dimension is positively correlated with
a firm’s participation in global markets. In particular, I find that more firms exports when they
6This is related to the literature on finance and product market competition. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) find
that lower bank concentration leads to more firm entry and a decline in average firm size. Dellas and Fernandes
(2007) and Stebunovs (2007) have formalized the findings into a general equilibrium model.
7See, for instance, Beck (2002, 2003), Matsuyama (2005), Becker and Greenberg (2007), and Manova (2008a) for
recent reviews of this literature.
8Source: The World Bank, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/portal/.
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have high net worth level or when they do not perceive access to finance as a constraint to their
investment, even after controlling for their productivity levels and sectoral effects.
2.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The Enterprise Surveys conducted by the World Bank mainly cover registered firms in manufactur-
ing and certain services industries. The topics covered in the surveys include the obstacles to doing
business, infrastructure, finance, labor, corruption and regulation, contract enforcement, law and
order, innovation and technology, and firm productivity. This is a very unique survey database as it
contains both the firms’ exporting status and the financial positions which is usually not available
especially for developing countries. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the final dataset and
presents evidence of the presence of financial frictions. The construction of this dataset is described
in more detail below.
Excessive loan collateral requirements are likely to constrain investment opportunities. As
shown in Table 1, in both countries the majority of firms that have loans face collateral requirements,
and these requirements are quite restrictive. For example, in the dataset for Brazil the percentage
of firms with loans requiring collateral compared to those firms that have loans is on average 67%,
and the mean value of collateral needed for a loan as a percentage of the loan amount is 123%. The
corresponding values for Chile are 68% and 113%, respectively. In addition, as can be seen from
Table 1, the average firm age before entering the foreign markets is quite high in both countries.
There are many reasons that can explain this finding, including the presence of financial frictions
as firms may not be able to finance the costs involved in exporting when they are young. The
surveys also provide indicators of how firms perceive their financial environment and finance their
investment. In Tables 2 and 3, I report the indicators that measure the degree to which firms
perceive access and costs of finance as a constraint to investment. In the surveys, firms indicate
whether they find access to finance or costs of finance as no obstacle, minor obstacle, moderate
obstacle, major obstacle, or very severe obstacle. In comparisons, firms in Brazil seem to face more
stringent obstacles.
To construct the final dataset, I drop non-manufacturing firms and firms that did not have
complete records of variables of interest, which are those regarding the firm’s export status, size,
production level, and balance sheet. In addition, only the data of the most recent fiscal year is
considered. Net worth level is defined as the equity from the balance sheet and only those with
positive net worth are included. To construct the productivity level, I use the data on the firm’s
total market value of production divided by firm size. If the total market value of production is not
available, I use the total value of sales. Two measures of firm size are used: the total assets from
the balance sheet and the average number of permanent workers. As will be seen, the results are
similar across the two measures, namely asset productivity and labor productivity, although the
concept of asset productivity is more relevant for my model. Then, I remove the sectoral effects
that may dictate how productive firms are by running the following regression for each concept of
productivity:
productivityi = b0 +
k−1∑
j=1
bj sectorij + εi (1)
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where k = the number of sectors in each country.9 and the dummy variable sectorij = 1 if the firm i
is in sector j and 0 otherwise. In this regression, b0 is the mean productivity of the reference sector
while (bj+b0) is the mean productivity of firms in sector j. Finally, I use the productivity level that
is not explained by the above regression, εi, as the proxy of an individual firm’s productivity level
and categorize them using a five point scale for productivity, based on their quintiles. Similarly,
firms are also categorized into 5-quintiles of net worth levels.
2.2 Descriptive Evidence
Using this dataset, I show that even after controlling for productivity levels, firms with higher net
worth or firms that are less financially constrained are more likely to become exporters. Figures
1-4 plot, for each of the five productivity bins, the ratios of exporters for two groups of firms: those
within the highest two quintiles of net worth and those within the lowest two quintiles. The clear
pattern observed in both countries is that the percentage of firms exporting is higher for the group
with higher net worth and the difference of the exporter ratios is on average 30% and can be as
high as 50%. Due to the problem that the size of net worth and the total value of assets tend
to be highly correlated, I also report the ratios of exporters for two groups of firms depending on
the levels of firms’ perception of access to finance as an obstacle to their investment. The first
group contains those firms that do not find access to finance an obstacle to investment or only
find it a minor obstacle. This group is then compared to those that view access to finance as a
major or very severe obstacle to investment. The results are shown in Figures 5-8. However, it
is important to note that, this indicator may also be highly correlated with firm size.10 As can
be seen, similar patterns arise: firms that face less obstacles to access to finance tend to become
exporters. In addition to these figures, Table 4 reports the mean age of firms starting exporting,
both conditioning on the net worth level and the access to finance indicator, and shows that firms
with high net worth or facing less obstacles tend to start exporting faster which complements the
findings above.
In the next section, I will present the model that can capture these characteristics of the
dataset in which a firm’s exporting decision depends not only on its productivity level but also on
its financial strength. In particular, firms with better financial positions are more likely to export.
3 Model
This is a model where two symmetric countries trade differentiated consumption goods and can
borrow and lend capital, a numeraire good, with the rest of the world at the risk-free interest rate
r. In each country, there is a continuum of project opportunities of mass 1 to produce consumption
goods. I refer to each project opportunity as a firm. Firms are heterogeneous and monopolistically
competitive. Time is discrete where t = 0, 1, 2, .... In each period t, the firms have the option to
operate and wheter or not to export. An operating firm produces a single product variety denoted
by ω. To isolate the importance of finance in firms’ export decisions, I assume that there are
no additional costs involved with international trade besides fixed costs of entering an exporting
market which are in units of capital.
9The surveys contain nine manufacturing sectors for Brazil and six for Chile
10Beck et al. (2005), using the World Business Environment Survey (WBES 2000) which covers over 4,000 firms
in 54 countries, find that it is the smallest firms that consistently are the most constrained.
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3.1 Consumers
The representative consumer owns the firms and has a C.E.S. utility function over the set of goods
that are available in the country in each period and discounts time at the rate β, 0 < β < 1. I
assume that the preference of the consumer takes the form
∑
t
βt
(∫
Ωt
ct(ω)ρdω
) 1
ρ
with 0 < ρ < 1.
σ = 1/ (1− ρ) > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution while Ωt denotes the measure of products
available in the country in period t and consists of the set of goods that are produced domestically
and the set of goods that are imported. Although the consumer own the firms, I assume that
saving and borrowing decisions are only done by firms. Consider the problem of the representative
consumer in country j, for example. Let Ωijt denote the set of goods produced in country i and
available for consumption in country j in period t. Thus, in each period, taking prices of each
good pjt (ω) available in the country as given, the representation consumer in country j chooses
consumption of each good ω, cjt (ω), from the set Ω
jj
t ∪ Ωijt to maximize the utility subject to the
following budget constraint: ∫
Ωjjt ∪ Ωijt
pjt (ω)c
j
t (ω)dω = I
j
t (2)
where Ijt denotes the aggregate disposable income of the representative consumer in country
j in period t. As is well known, the solution to the consumer’s problem leads to the indi-
rect demand function for a particular variety ω of the form cjt (ω) =
Ijt
P jt
(
pjt (ω)
P jt
)−σ
where P jt = ∫
Ωjjt ∪ Ωijt
pjt (ω)
1−σdω
 11−σ is the composite price index in country j in period t. Equivalently, the
indirect demand function implies that each firm is facing the following pricing schedule:
pjt (ω) =
(
Ijt
P jt
1
cjt (ω)
)1/σ
P jt (3)
Note that this pricing schedule is the channel in which this model departs from the standard models.
Here, the quantity of the products that firms can offer to the markets may be restricted due to the
financial frictions they are facing. In other words, the firms’ pricing has to adjust according to the
above schedule, depending on the amount of the products they serve the market. Therefore, in this
environment the price that each firm charges may no longer be equal to a constant markup of its
marginal costs as in the case of the standard model. I explain the problem of each firm in more
detail next.
3.2 Firms
As mentioned before, each firm produces only a single variety; therefore, we can identify each of
them by the variety it produces, denoted by ω. They are heterogeneous in two dimensions: net
worth nt and productivity zt. I assume that at the beginning of each period, each firm is subject
to the same exogenous death probability ϕ.
Assumption 1: 0 < ϕ < 1
6
In period t, new firms draw their productivity level zt from a distribution g(z) with support Z.
The incumbent and surviving firms’ productivity level evolves according to the transition function
Q(zt/zt−1), which is assumed to be identical for all firms. Capital is the only input for production
and is a numeraire good. If operating, firms incur a per-period fixed cost of production of fd > 0
units of capital. In addition to this fixed cost of operating, firms have to incur an extra per-period
fixed cost of fx > 0 if they decide to export. These fixed costs are assumed to be identical across
all firms.
Each firm has an increasing returns to scale production technology, which depends on its
productivity zt and the amount of capital kt it uses. In particular, a domestic firm operates by the
following production function, yt = ztmax
{
kt − fd, 0
}
, while an exporting firm produces according
to yt = ztmax
{
kt − fd − fx, 0
}
. The level of production kt can be financed with the firm’s own
net worth it and one-period debt bt. Feasibility of internal financing requires that 0 ≤ it ≤ nt.
The amount of unused net worth (nt − it) can be invested through financial intermediaries at the
risk-free interest rate rt. Each firm, however, is subject to a borrowing constraint that specifies
a limited amount of capital that can be externally financed. In particular, I assume that this
borrowing constraint takes the following form
bt ≤ ηnt
where η > 0 is a fixed borrowing factor, assumed identical for all firms. I think of this factor η as
summarizing the degree of financial frictions in a given economy: higher η corresponds to better
access to finance by all firms. Given this specification, the level of production of each firm is given
by
kt = it + bt
where 0 ≤ it ≤ nt and 0 ≤ bt ≤ ηnt.
Note that in this environment, firms face a borrowing constraint that depends only on their
net worth. While this is a quite restrictive assumption, the effects of financial frictions can easily
be isolated since only the firm’s financial positions (as represented by its net worth level), not
its productivity level, determines the amount of debt. This assumption may be reasonable if, for
example, financial intermediaries cannot verify the firm’s productivity level, and thus, they can
only base their lending decisions on what is verifiable, the financial position of the firm. In general,
financial constraints can depend on both the firm’s financial position and productivity level. For
example, borrowing constraints can emerge endogenously from the enforcement problem of debt
contracts as that in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), or from the optimal contract in the
presence of asymmetric information between the lender and the borrower as that in Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006)
The timing within each period is as follows. At the beginning of the period, firms observe their
productivity level and whether they are hit by the exogenous death probability ϕ which forces
them to exit. The surviving firms choose whether to operate in the current period and whether
to enter the foreign market. If they decide to operate, they choose the level of production, the
financing plan, and the distribution policy of their outputs among the markets they participate
in accordingly. At the end of the period after their income is realized and debts are repaid, firms
choose the level of dividend payouts and the end-of-period net worth (retained earnings) by taking
into account the evolution of their productivity Q(zt+1/zt) and the probability of death ϕ in the
next period while discounting the future at the same rate β as the consumer.
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3.2.1 Firm’s Problem
As described above, each firm has both static and dynamic problems. The static decisions involve
the production level, the pattern of financing, the export participation, and the distribution of its
product while the dynamic decisions involve the policies on the dividend payouts and the end-of-
period net worth. Although the model features dynamics, I will focus on stationary equilibria with
time invariant levels of risk-free interest rate, aggregate price indices, aggregate income, and the
distribution of firms in each country. Therefore, the time subscripts will be dropped. In what
follows, I explain the problem of a firm that starts the period with net worth n and productivity
level z and survives the exogenous death probability.
Firm’s Recursive Problem Given {I, P, r}, the aggregate prices and incomes in the two sym-
metric countries, and the risk-free interest rate, a firm with (n, z) makes the operating, exporting,
retained earnings, and dividends decisions to maximize its value. Omitting the aggregate variables
in the notation, let V (n, z) denote the value of the firm and Π(n, z) denote its current-period net
income before the dividend distribution policy. Then, the firm’s recursive problem can be written
as follows:
V (n, z) = max
n′
Π(n, z)− n′ + β (1− ϕ)
∫
V (n′, z′)Q(z′/z)dz′
s.t. 0 ≤ n′ ≤ Π(n, z)
where n′(n, z) is the policy on the end-of-period level of net worth, and thus, this implies the
dividend policy of D(n, z) = Π(n, z) − n′(n, z). Here I assume that the dividends cannot be
negative i.e. firms cannot issue new equity to the consumer. The current-period net income is
given by the maximum value of the three options the firm has: not to operate but lend out its net
worth at the prevailing interest rate, to operate as a domestic firm, or to operate as an exporter.
In other words, the current-period net income is
Π(n, z) = max{(1 + r)n, pid(n, z), pix(n, z)}
where pid(n, z) denotes the net income of the firm if it serves only the domestic market and pix(n, z)
denotes the net income if it also exports. Let χd(n, z) and χx(n, z) be the indicator functions that
specify the decision rule for operating as a domestic firm or as an exporter, respectively. Thus we
have,
χd(n, z) =
{
1 if pid(n, z) > max{(1 + r)n, pix(n, z)}
0 otherwise
and
χx(n, z) =
{
1 if pix(n, z) > max{(1 + r)n, pid(n, z)}
0 otherwise
As will be shown in the derivation of pid(n, z) and pix(n, z), financial frictions may distort
the firm’s operating and exporting decisions from the environment in which they faces no financial
constraints. More importantly, in contrast to the previous literature, in this model financial frictions
do not only alter the firm’s net profits but also its scale of production. As a result, the final effect on
the firms’ decisions is no longer clear as there are two countervailing forces operating simultaneously.
First, at any given level of aggregate prices, income levels, and interest rate, the firm may not be
able to operate at the unconstrained optimal scale and, thus, may find operating and/or exporting
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less attractive. However, there is also a general equilibrium effect at work. As the rest of the firms
in the economy are also in a similar situation, the aggregate price and aggregate income indices will
adjust. Intuitively, tighter borrowing constraints for the overall economy lead to a higher aggregate
price and a lower aggregate income. A higher aggregate price, on the one hand, induces the firm
to enter the markets as there is a higher demand for its product. A lower aggregate income, on
the other hand, decreases the consumer’s demand for the firm’s product. As a consequence, if the
financial friction problem is severe enough and the aggregate price effect dominates the income
effect, the firm may decide to enter the domestic and/or export markets even if it would not have
done so in the frictionless economy. Numerical exercises in Section 5 will show this case in which
worsening financial environment can lead to an entrance of unproductive firms, those that would
not have entered in the better financial environment.
Next, I show the derivation of pid(n, z) and pix(n, z). Facing the aggregate income and price
levels, the interest rate, and the indirect demand for its product in each market given by the pricing
schedule (3), each firm chooses the level of production and the distribution of its product optimally
subject to its feasibility and borrowing constraints. Equivalently, this problem can be broken down
into two steps. First, for a given level of capital k, I solve for the firm’s maximum sales revenue.
Then, given the revenue function, I solve for the optimal level of production and financing plan.
The two-step derivation is explained in more detail below.
Sales Revenue Intuitively, a domestic firm’s maximum sales revenue comes from the sales of all
its outputs in the domestic market at the price given by the pricing schedule (3). An exporting
firm, on the other hand, will have to take into account the indirect demand function of the foreign
market as well and make decisions on how to distribute its outputs between the two markets. The
problems of a non-exporting firm and an exporting firm are formally written below. To simplify
the notions, here I will use superscript d to index the variables in the firm’s domestic market while
those in the foreign market are indexed by superscript f .
Sales Revenue of Non-Exporting Firms Taking the pricing schedule from the indirect
demand function in the domestic market as given, a non-exporting firm with the level of production
k and productivity z maximizes the sale revenues from only selling its product in the domestic
market:
Rd(k, z) = max
yd
pdyd
s.t. yd ≤ zmax
{
k − fd, 0
}
pd =
(
Id
P dyd
)1/σ
P d
Intuitively, the solution to this problem is to sell all the outputs yd = zmax
{
k − fd, 0} at the
given price. As a result, the sales revenue function of a non-exporting firm with level of production
k and productivity z takes the following form:
Rd(k, z) =
(
Id
P d
)1/σ
P d
[
zmax
{
k − fd, 0
}]1−1/σ
(4)
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which is differentiable for k > fd and for given aggregate prices, income levels, and the risk-free
interest rate, we have
Rd1(k, z) > 0, R
d
2(k, z) > 0 (5)
Rd11(k, z) < 0, R
d
12(k, z) > 0, and R
d
22(k, z) < 0 (6)
Sales Revenue of Exporting Firms Given the indirect demand functions of its products
from both the local and foreign markets, an exporting firm with the level of production k and
productivity z chooses how to distribute output between the two markets to maximize its total
sales revenue given by:
Rx(k, z) = max
yd,yf
pdyd + pfyf
s.t. yd + yf ≤ zmax
{
k − fd − fx, 0
}
pd =
(
Id
P dyd
)1/σ
P d and pf =
(
If
P fyf
)1/σ
P f
In general, each firm divides its sales between the domestic and the foreign markets on the
basis of the ratio of its country income level and aggregate price index to that of the other country.
Since we focus on a symmetric two-country model where Id = If = I and P d = P f = P , the firm’s
optimal distribution policy is simply to supply both markets the same amount. In other words, we
have yf = yd = 12y where y = zmax
{
k − fd − fx, 0}. In this case, the sales revenue function of an
exporting firm with level of production k and productivity z is given by the following function:11
Rx(k, z) = 2
(
I
P
)1/σ
P
(y
2
)1−1/σ
(7)
for given aggregate prices, income levels, and the interest rate, the revenue function is differ-
entiable for k > fd + fx and we have
Rx1(k, z) > 0, R
x
2(k, z) > 0 (8)
Rx11(k, z) < 0, R
x
12(k, z) > 0, and R
x
22(k, z) < 0
Recall that this model abstracts from any variable costs of exporting or tariffs. If these features
are present, firms will have to adjust the distribution of their products accordingly.
Next, given these revenue functions, I solve for the optimal level of production and financing
plan for each exporting status.
11For a general case where the two countries need not to be symmetric, yd = 1
Ad
Af
−σ
+1
y and yf =

Ad
Af
−σ
yd =

Ad
Af
−σ

Ad
Af
−σ
+1
y where Ad ≡

Id
Pd
1/σ
P d and Af ≡

If
Pf
1/σ
P f . Thus, in this case Rx(i + b, z)
=
0
B@Ad
 
1
Ad
Af
−σ
+1
!1−1/σ
+Af
0
@

Ad
Af
−σ

Ad
Af
−σ
+1
1
A
1−1/σ1CA y1−1/σ.
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Net Income of Operating Firms An operating firm’s net income comes from the sales revenue
of its product, the sales of its undepreciated capital (at the price of 1 as capital is the numeraire
good), and the return from lending unused net worth after the debt repayment obligation has been
made.
Net Income of a Non-Exporting Firm pid(n, z): Given the aggregate income levels, price
indices, and market interest rate, a non-exporting firm with net worth n and productivity level z
chooses the level of investment from its own savings, i, and the amount of borrowing, b, to maximize
its net income subject to its feasibility and borrowing constraints. In other words, the firm is solving
the following problem:
pid(n, z) = max
i≥0,b≥0
Rd(i+ b, z) + (1− δ)max
{
i+ b− fd, 0
}
(9)
+(1 + r)(n− i)− (1 + r)b
s.t. i ≤ n and b ≤ ηn
where the sales revenue function Rd(i + b, z) is given by (4) derived earlier. Let id(n, z) and
bd(n, z) denote the policy functions on the financing plan associated with the above problem. Then,
kd(n, z) = id(n, z) + bd(n, z) is the firm’s resulting constrained optimal level of production. Note
that if the corner solution arises, i.e. both id(n, z) = 0 and bd(n, z) = 0, we have pid(n, z) = (1+r)n,
its reservation value from just lending out all its net worth.
Net Income of an Exporting Firm pix(n, z): Similarly, given the aggregate income levels,
prices indices, and interest rate, an exporting firm with net worth n and productivity level z chooses
the production level and financing plan to solve the following problem:
pix(n, z) = max
i≥0,b≥0
Rx(i+ b, z) + (1− δ)max
{
i+ b− fd − fx, 0
}
(10)
+(1 + r)(n− i)− (1 + r)b
s.t. i ≤ n and b ≤ ηn
where the sales revenue function Rx(i + b, z) is given by (7). Let ix(n, z) and bx(n, z) denote the
policy function associated with the above problem; then the firm’s constrained optimal level of
production is kx(n, z) = ix(n, z) + bx(n, z). Again, in the case that the corner solution arises, i.e.
both ix(n, z) = 0 and bx(n, z) = 0, we have pix(n, z) = (1 + r)n.
This completes the descriptions of a firm’s problem. The solutions to problems (9) and (10)
above will be characterized in more detail in Section 4. As will be seen, with borrowing constraints
the direct relationship between the firm’s price and marginal costs (and thus the productivity level)
may no longer hold. In particular, a constrained firm cannot attain the optimal level output and
must charge a higher price, given by its pricing schedule. Thus, it is possible that an unconstrained
but less productive firm may be able to charge a lower price than another firm that is more
productive but financially constrained.
Before I define an equilibrium for this economy, I consider the rest of the world with which firms
can borrow and lend capital. The rest of the world is assumed to have large enough endowments in
capital that they can lend at any amount demanded by the firms in the two countries at the risk-free
interest rate r. They are also assumed to have linear preferences in capital and discount the future
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at the rate β. Due to these assumptions, the risk-free interest rate is pinned down to r = 1/β − 1.
Thus, with the positive exogenous death probability for firms ϕ > 0 given by Assumption 1, we
have the following condition:
1
β
> (1− ϕ)(1 + r). (11)
This condition will guarantee that there is an upper bound on the amount of net worth a
firm will accumulate. In particular, when a firm has accumulated a large enough net worth, the
additional benefits of net worth in terms of relaxing the borrowing constraint vanish, and the firm
will start distributing dividends.
Also, given the structure of the firms’ evolution, entry, and exit, the representative consumer’s
disposable income must be defined carefully. In particular, since the consumer owns all firms
in the country, the consumer’s income comes from the dividend payouts of the surviving firms.
However, the consumer must also cover the aggregate net worth given to the new entrants. Thus,
the disposable income of the representative consumer in country j is given by
Ij =
∫
Ωj+
D(ω)dω −
∫
Ej
n(ω)dω (12)
where Ωj+ denotes the set of firms that survive the death shocks and Ej denotes the set of the new
entrants. Recall that in this model, the measure of the exiting firms is equal to ϕ. We now define
an equilibrium for the model.
3.3 Equilibrium
I consider a stationary equilibrium in which aggregate prices, aggregate income levels, and distri-
butions of firms in each countries are constant overtime. A recursive equilibrium for a symmetric
two-country model is defined by
• the policy functions of firms χd(n, z), χx(n, z), id(n, z), ix(n, z), bd(n, z), bx(n, z), and
n′(n, z);
• the distribution of firms G(n, z);
• the mass of new entrants E(G(n, z));
• the aggregate price P and aggregate income I; and
• the interest rate r
such that in each country
1. taking as given (P, I, r) and the indirect demand functions that come from solving the
consumer’s problem, the firms’ policy functions satisfy their optimization problem; consumer max-
imizes utility subject to (12);
2. the distribution of firms and the aggregate variables are consistent with individual firms’
decisions and the entry and exit rules;
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3. the mass of new entrants is equal to the mass of firms exiting exogenously by death shocks;
and
4. the interest rate r = 1/β − 1.
Definition of a stationary equilibrium: With a time invariant level of risk-free interest rate, a
stationary equilibrium for this economy is an equilibrium as defined above in which the aggregate
price index, aggregate income, and the distribution of firms in each country are constant over time.
To illustrate the distortionary effect associated with financial frictions, I first consider the
one-period version of the model and compare the firms’ decisions to those in the unconstrained
environment where firms are not limited on how much they can borrow. This is the case where η
equals to ∞; thus, the borrowing constraint is never binding and can be dropped out of the firms’
problems.
4 Characterizations of Equilibrium
First, I show that the one-period and unconstrained version of the model collapses to an equivalence
of the Melitz (2003) model in which firms’ operating and exporting decisions only depend on their
productivity level. In particular, the model can be solved analytically for certain distribution
function of firms over (n, z). Then, I characterize the firms’ decisions in the environment with
financial frictions.
4.1 One-Period Version of the Model
In this environment, firms will choose not to hold any net worth at the end of the period n′(n, z) = 0
and pay out all their income as dividends D(n, z) = Π(n, z). Thus, trivially we have the value of
the firm V (n, z) = Π(n, z). Since this is a one-period version, I consider the case that there is no
exogenous death probability, and thus, no notion of new entrants at the end of the period. The
distribution of firms over (n, z) is given exogenously and is assumed that n and z are independently
Pareto distributed with the same Pareto index γ. Therefore, in this case, the density function of
firms of the type (n, z) is given by
G(n, z) = g(n)g(z)
where g(n) = γ (nm)
γ
nγ+1
, g(z) = γ (zm)
γ
zγ+1
, and nm > 0 and zm > 0 are the minimum support of n
and z, respectively. Next, I derive the unconstrained equilibrium and use it as a benchmark for
comparisons with the equilibrium with borrowing constraints.
4.1.1 Unconstrained Environment
Let pid(n, z) and pix(n, z) denote the unconstrained net income of the non-exporting and exporting
firms, respectively. Since firms are not limited on how much they can borrow, the problem of each
firm (n, z) can be rewritten as follows:
V (n, z) = Π(n, z) = max{(1 + r)n, pid(n, z), pix(n, z)}
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where
pid(n, z) = max
n≥ i ≥0, b≥0
Rd(i+ b, z) + (1− δ)max
{
i+ b− fd, 0
}
+(1 + r)(n− i)− (1 + r)b; and
pix(n, z) = max
n≥ i ≥0, b≥0
Rx(i+ b, z) + (1− δ)max
{
i+ b− fd − fx, 0
}
+(1 + r)(n− i)− (1 + r)b
and Rd(i+ b, z) and Rx(i+ b, z) are given by (4) and (7).
As shown in Proposition 1, in this environment, each firm always operates at the unconstrained
optimal scale and its decisions to operate and/or export will only depend on its productivity,
independent of its net worth. Therefore, the model reduces to that similar to Melitz (2003). In
proving Proposition 1, Assumption 2 is needed for the aggregate income and prices to be finite
while Assumptions 3 and 4 regarding the fixed costs guarantee that the cutoffs for operating and
exporting be binding, since then not all firms choose to operate and export in equilibrium.
Assumption 2: σ − γ − 1 < 0.
Assumption 3: 2fd > N where N =
∫
n(ω)dω.
Assumption 4: fx > fd.
Let zFB denote the equilibrium productivity cutoff level for operating decisions and zFB denote
the corresponding equilibrium productivity cutoff level for exporting. Then, by Proposition 1, firms
with high enough productivity, i.e. z ≥ zFB, will enter the domestic market while those very
productive firms, z ≥ zFB, will also export.
Proposition 1. Given interest rate r, a firm’s operating and exporting decisions in the uncon-
strained environment depend only on its productivity level, and the decisions are characterized by
two cutoffs zFB and zFB where all firms with z ≥ zFB operate and those with z ≥ zFB export and
zm < z
FB < zFB <∞. In particular,
zFB = zm
[
fd
]1/(σ−1)1− 1/σ − γσ − γ − 1
[[
fd
](σ−γ−1)/(σ−1) + [fx](σ−γ−1)/(σ−1)]
N

1/γ
and
zFB = zm [f
x]1/(σ−1)
1− 1/σ − γσ − γ − 1
[[
fd
](σ−γ−1)/(σ−1) + [fx](σ−γ−1)/(σ−1)]
N

1/γ
As can be seen, both cutoffs are independent of the interest rate r while they are decreasing
in N , the aggregate amount of net worth in the country. Given the functional form above, the
number of varieties increases with the size of the economy, but not linearly, due to the factor γ.
With this result, the optimal decision rules for operating as a domestic firm and as an exporter are
given by the following indicator functions:
χd(n, z) =
{
1 if zFB ≤ z < zFB
0 otherwise
and
χx(n, z) =
{
1 if z ≥ zFB
0 otherwise
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Appendix 3.A presents the proof of the Proposition as well as the derivations of the uncon-
strained production levels (kd(z), kx(z)), price functions (pd(z), px(z)), sales revenue functions
(Rd(z), Rx(z)), all of which are independent of n, and the value functions (pid(n, z), pix(n, z)) of a
non-exporting firm and an exporting firm, respectively. Next, I derive the firms’ decision rules in
an environment with borrowing constraints.
4.1.2 With Borrowing Constraints
In this case, I show that not only the productivity level matters for the firms’ operating and
exporting decisions, but the net worth level also plays an important role. For example, although
there is a minimum productivity level below which firms will not find operating profitable, this will
no longer guarantee that firms with productivity higher than this level will actually operate. In
order to operate, they also need to have a high enough net worth. In other words, there is another
dimension of cutoff decision rules in terms of net worth that a firm will take into account. As will
be seen, for a given productivity, firms with high net worth are more likely to become exporters
similar to what is found in Section 2.
Formally, let z denote the minimum cutoff productivity level for operating, i.e. z = inf{z :
pid(n, z) > max{(1 + r)n, pix(n, z)} for all n}. Thus, firms that are not productive enough
with z < z will not find operating profitable no matter how much net worth they have. How-
ever, for those z > z, the decision whether or not to operate will also depend on the firm’s net
worth. Note that z is generally different from zFB since the equilibrium aggregate price and
income may differ across the two environments. Let nd(z) denote this threshold level of net
worth below which firms will not be able to operate profitably. In particular, for z > z, nd(z)
= inf
{
n ≥ 0 : pid(n, z) > max{(1 + r)n, pix(n, z)}} and, therefore, for those firms with for z > z
and n ≤ nd(z), pid(n, z) = (1 + r)n.
Similarly, in this environment there will be a cutoff productivity level for exporting which,
again, can be different from zFB. Let z denote this cutoff level and z = inf{z : pix(n, z) > max{(1+
r)n, pid(n, z)} for all n} and, thus, firms with z < z will not export regardless of their net worth
levels. Like the case of the entry decision into the domestic market above, there will be another
cutoff in terms of net worth which will specify whether firms will find exporting profitable. This net
worth threshold for z > z is defined as nx(z) = inf
{
n ≥ 0 : pix(n, z) > max{(1 + r)n, pid(n, z)}} .
Intuitively, with borrowing constraints both net worth and productivity determine the oper-
ating and exporting decisions. On the one hand, firms of a given productivity choose to operate
and/or export if they are large enough to run their business at a profitable scale. On the other
hand, firms of a given size choose to operate and/or export if they are productive enough. With
the definitions of all the cutoffs both in terms of net worth and productivity above, we can write
the decision rules for operating as a domestic firm and as an exporter as follows:
χd(n, z) =
{
1 if (1)z ≤ z < z and n ≥ nd(z) or (2) z ≥ z and nd(z) ≤ n < nx(z)
0 otherwise
and
χx(n, z) =
{
1 if z ≥ z and n ≥ nx(z)
0 otherwise
In Proposition 2, I show that besides the thresholds nd(z) and nx(z) above, there are two
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additional thresholds that specify the required minimum levels of net worth to achieve the uncon-
strained efficient scale of operating and exporting, thus, allowing firms to attain the unconstrained
values of net income pid(n, z) and pix(n, z), respectively. Let nd(z) denote that for a non-exporting
firm and is defined as nd(z) = inf{n ≥ 0 : id(n, z)+ bd(n, z) = kd(z)} for z > z. Similarly, let nx(z)
denote the net worth level to achieve the unconstrained efficient scale for an exporting firm and is
defined as nx(z) = inf{n ≥ 0 : ix(n, z) + bx(n, z) = kx(z)} for z > z. Therefore, potentially there
are five groups of firms in equilibrium on the space of (n, z): non-operating firms, unconstrained
and constrained non-exporting firms, and unconstrained and constrained exporting firms.
Before we derive the properties of these four thresholds of net worth in Proposition 2, Lemma
1 derives properties of the firms’ production levels and net-income functions.
Lemma 1. For 0 < η <∞,
(i) id(n, z) = n, bd(n, z) = ηn, and pid(n, z) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in n on
[nd(z), nd(z)) for all z > z;
(ii) ix(n, z) = n, bx(n, z) = ηn, and pix(n, z) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in n on
[nx(z), nx(z)) for all z > z.
Lemma 1 states that it is optimal for a constrained firm, be it a non-exporting firm or an
exporting firm, to invest all its net worth in their production and to borrow up to the limit. In
particular, in the proof of Lemma 1, I establish that pid1(n, z) and pi
x
1 (n, z) are strictly higher than
(1 + r) for a financially constrained firm and approaching (1 + r) as net worth approaches nd(z)
and nx(z), for a domestic firm and an exporting firm respectively. This is a usual result of models
with financial frictions as there is an extra incentive for firms to save to overcome their financial
constraints.
Proposition 2. For 0 < η <∞, the four thresholds of net worth have the following properties:
(i) for all z > z, nd(z) = k
d
(z)
1+η and n
d(z) is strictly increasing in z;
(ii) for all z > z, nd(z) ∈
(
fd
1+η , n
d(z)
)
and nd(z) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in
z;
(iii) for all z > z, nx(z) = k
x
(z)
1+η and n
x(z) is strictly increasing in z;
(iv) for all z > z, nx(z) ∈ (nd(z), nx(z)] is strictly decreasing in z.
The proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 are shown in Appendix 3.A. Given the above results,
if zm < z < z i.e. the productivity cutoffs are binding, we have five different groups of firms in
equilibrium as illustrated in Figure 9. As can be seen from the figure, conditioning on net worth,
the propensity to operate and/or export increases with productivity and similarly, conditioning on
productivity, the propensity to operate and export increases with net worth levels. However, the
distortionary effects of borrowing constraints, which is the case when z < zFB and z < zFB, cannot
be proven analytically. This can be seen since we do not have the analytical functions of nd(z) and
nx(z) and, thus, we do not have the closed-form functions of the aggregate prices and income levels
taking into account the decision rules of all firms. However, it is likely that a distortion will occur
if the aggregate price effect dominates the aggregate income effect. Intuitively, financial frictions
constrain firms’ scale of operation and force them to charge higher prices. Overall, aggregate price
tends to increase while aggregate income declines. When the price effect dominates, cutoffs move
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left and less productive firms are able to enter profitably. Next, I characterize the dynamic model
using the firm’s optimal static decision rules above.
4.2 Dynamic Model
Given the optimal static entry and exporting decisions above, the dynamic problem of a firm with
(n, z) can be rewritten as follows:
V (n, z) = max
n′
Π(n, z)− n′ + β (1− ϕ)
∫
V (n′, z′)Q(z′/z)dz′
s.t. 0 ≤ n′ ≤ Π(n, z)
where Π(n, z) has the following properties:
Π(n, z) =

pix(n, z) if z ≥ z and n ≥ nx(z)
pid(n, z) if (1) z < z ≤ z and n ≥ nd(z) or (2) z ≥ z and nd(z) ≤ n < nx(z)
(1 + r)n otherwise
(13)
With the above functional form of Π(n, z) and the proof of Lemma 1, we have Π1(n, z) ≥ (1+r).
As can be seen above, for non-operating firms, Π1(n, z) = (1 + r). However, this is also true for
unconstrained firms as for these firms there is no extra benefit of accumulating net worth exceeding
nd(z) or nx(z). These firms can operate at their efficient scale and, therefore, their extra net worth
would only be invested at the risk-free interest rate. Financially constrained firms, on the contrary,
will have an extra incentive to save as the additional net worth that they accumulate will help
relax their borrowing constraint in the next period. Specifically, as shown in Appendix 3.A, for
constrained domestic firms Π1(n, z) = pid1(n, z) = (1 + η)
[
Rd1((1 + η)n, z) + (1− δ)− (1 + r)
]
+
(1 + r) > (1 + r) since (1 + η)n < kd(z) and, similarly, for constrained exporters Π1(n, z) =
pix1 (n, z) = (1 + η) [R
x
1((1 + η)n, z) + (1− δ)− (1 + r)] + (1 + r) > (1 + r).
In what follows, I show that the deterministic version of the model, in which firms’ productivity
is constant over time, can feature the persistent distortion of financial frictions on firms’ entry
decisions: productive firms that do not have enough initial net worth will follow the path of
disaccumulation of net worth and, as a result, they will eventually not operate and thus, not
export. This is quite a striking result in that it differs from the usual view of firms always saving
their way out of the borrowing constraints. To put it differently, there can be another threshold of
net worth such that firms with net worth below this level will choose to disaccumulate net worth
at the end of the period and eventually they will reach the state where they do not hold any net
worth. As a result, given the form of the borrowing constraints they are facing, will stay in this
state forever i.e. they will eventually not operate and/or export. Thus, this model features the
poverty trap issue and this may be due to the fact that the discounted benefits of accumulating net
worth is lower than the cost of interest or it takes too long for a firm to accumulate asset out of
the credit constraints. For example, in the next section, we will see that in the deterministic case
there exists at least a threshold of net worth, such that when firms start the period with net worth
low enough, these firms will optimally choose to disaccumulate their net worth. Moreover, this
threshold is strictly decreasing and that the more restrictive the borrowing constraint (the lower
the η), the higher the threshold.
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5 Numerical Exercises
To illustrate the model’s long-term effects of borrowing constraints, I use the concept of a stationary
equilibrium. In particular, I perform numerical exercises by varying the degree of the tightness of
the borrowing constraints η.
5.1 Parametrization
Currently, the model has not been calibrated to any particular country. The following are standard
parameter values.
Parameter Description Comments
β = 0.956 Intertemporal discount rate Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
ρ = 0.6 So that elasticity of substitution σ = 2.5
δ = 0.07 Depreciation rate Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
ϕ = 0.05 Probability of exogenous exit Exit rate 3-7% per year Bartels-
man et al. (2005)
η = 3 (benchmark) Borrowing constraint factor Buera and Shin (2007)
The rest of the parameters are ones that in the stationary equilibrium of the benchmark model,
the productivity cutoffs are binding and the ratio of the fixed costs of operating to the aggregate
capital is approximately 4%.
Parameter Description Comments
fd = 10 Fixed costs of operating
fx = 20 Fixed costs of exporting Chosen relative to fd
E(G(n, z)) uniformly distributed Distribution of new entrants over (n, z)
5.2 Illustrative Numerical Examples: Deterministic Dynamic Model
In this section, I consider the deterministic version of the model and compare the results of the
benchmark model with η = 3 to those of the case with η = 0.8 (corresponding to the value of
Brazil in Section 2). Figures 10 - 14 present the results of the numerical exercises. Panel a) of each
figure presents the results for the benchmark model whereas panel b) corresponds to those of the
environment with tighter borrowing constraints.
Figure 10 shows the firms’ entry and export decision rules which confirm that with borrowing
constraints both net worth and productivity affect the firms’ decisions. In particular, for a given
level of net worth, firms with high enough productivity will enter and those that are even more
productive will export. By the same token, for a given productivity level, firms that have high net
worth will choose to operate and those with even higher levels of net worth will be more likely to
export. By comparing Figure 10 panels a) and b), we see that a reduction of η from 3 to 0.8 leads
to a distortionary effect. From the figure, the cutoffs of productivity for entry and export decisions,
z and z, are lower with η = 0.8, implying that, in this case, less productive firms can enter the
domestic market and/or the foreign market profitably, although they would not have found entry
and export profitable in the less restrictive environment. On the contrary, the threshold levels
of net worth required for entry and exporting, nd(z) and nx(z), are higher in panel b). This is
intuitive, as the lower the borrowing limit, the higher the net worth needed to finance the fixed
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costs.
Figure 11 elaborates on Figure 10 by indicating the financial conditions of each operating firm
in addition to the entry and exporting decisions. In both panels, the five regions of (n, z) similar
to those in Figure 9 are presented. For firms with the same exporting status, those with high net
worth are more likely to operate on a more efficient scale. More importantly, with tighter borrowing
constraints firms require much higher net worth to achieve the efficient scale. That is, we have nd(z)
and nx(z) shift up with lower η.
Figure 12 illustrates how firms distribute their current-period net income Π(n, z) between
the end-of-period net worth n′(n, z) and the dividend payouts D(n, z). Within each panel, the
Π(n, z), n′(n, z), and D(n, z) functions are plotted for three groups of firms: those with the lowest
productivity level z1, those with medium-range productivity znz/2, and those most productive firms
znz. The first similarity between the two panels is that the net income function is increasing in
both arguments. Also, the least productive firms do not accumulate any net worth at the end of the
period, thus, distributing all income as dividends. Firms with higher productivity, on the contrary,
tend to accumulate more net worth, thus, not distributing dividends right away. This is with the
exception of firms with sufficiently low net worth, represented by those at the lower left corner of
each diagram. This is surprising and suggests that financial frictions can have persistent effects on
firms’ decisions to enter the market. As discussed in Section 4.2, with firms discounting the future
heavily enough, it may be the case that they optimally choose not to save, as saving involves too
much of a sacrifice. When comparisons are made between the two panels, we see that the most
productive firms with high net worth are actually doing better with more restrictive borrowing
conditions. The intuition for this is that with lower η, the firm’s competitors are doing much worse
and while they are forced to charge a higher price, there will be more demand for the firm’s product.
Also, it is clear from the figure that with lower η, firms have to save more in order to overcome the
borrowing constraints and, thus, they will start paying out dividends later. This also implies that
there is a larger dispersion of firm size as compared to the case with higher η. In other words, with
tighter borrowing constraints, the largest firms are much larger than the smallest ones.
Figure 13 further elaborates on Figure 12 presenting the saving policy functions for all firms
over the (n, z) space. In particular, they show the existence of the poverty trap issue as there
are firms that do not disaccumulate assets at the end of the period, even for those that are very
productive. Figure 14 plots the dynamics of net worth accumulation for three groups of firms with
different productivity levels. The intersection between the firms’ saving policy function and the
45-degree line indicate the threshold of net worth below which firms will disaccumulate net worth
and thus will eventually reach the state where they have no assets. As can be seen this threshold
decreases with productivity level while increasing with η.12
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the effects of financial market imperfections on a firm’s operating and export-
ing decisions. I develop a trade model with heterogeneous firms facing borrowing constraints in
financing their production. This framework is able to capture the positive relationship between
entry into foreign markets and firms’ financial strengths as often seen as evidence in favor of finan-
12This result is supported by the evidence on the contribution of the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector.
Ayyagari et al. (2007) find that low entry costs, easy access to finance (low costs of property registration which ease
the collateralization process) and greater information sharing predict a large SME sector in manufacturing.
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cial constraints. In particular, this paper addresses the relationship by modeling the endogenous
determination of firms’ financial positions and export participation. The model also provides an un-
derstanding of how entry and exporting decisions depend on firms’ financial positions and provides
insights on the costs of financial frictions to countries in terms of the misallocation of resources
away from productive firms.
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Appendix 3.A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Non-Exporting Firms: Since in the absence of borrowing contraints i and b enter the problem
of a non-exporting firm in the same way, the net income and thus the value of a non-exporting firm
is equivalent to V d(n, z) = pid(n, z) = max
k≥0
Rd(k, z) + (1− δ)max{k − fd, 0}− (1+ r)k+ (1+ r)n
where k = i + b. Let kd(n, z) ≡ argmax
k≥0
V
d(n, z) denote the unconstrained first-best production
level. From the first-order condition that characterizes the solution to this problem, we have
Rd1(k, z) = (δ + r). After using the sales revenue function (4) and to simplify the notation let
A ≡ ( IP )1/σ P, the unconstrained first-best production level of a non-exporting firm with (n, z)
turns out to depend only on the productivity level z and independent of the net worth. Thus, we
can rewrite kd(z) instead of kd(n, z) and in particular we have
k
d(z) =
[
A (1− 1/σ) z1−1/σ
δ + r
]σ
+ fd (14)
Thus, kd(z) is increasing in z, but the curvature depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution
σ. In particular, kd(z) is strictly convex in z if σ > 2, linear if σ = 2, and strictly concave if
2 > σ > 1. Note that although the optimal level of production kd(z) is uniquely pinned down,
any financing plan such that id(n; z) + bd(n; z) = kd(z) and id(n; z) ≤ n is feasible. As a result,
the price level associated with the first-best level of production and thus the sales revenue will also
turn out to be independent of net worth. Let pd(z) denote that price and Rd(z) denote the sales
revenue function, then from the indirect demand function, we have
pd(z) = A
 1
z
(
k
d(z)− fd
)
1/σ = δ + r
(1− 1/σ) z =
δ + r
ρz
and (15)
R
d(z) =
[
Az1−1/σ
]σ [1− 1/σ
δ + r
]σ−1
(16)
Thus, more productive firms are charging lower prices and the price is a constant markup of the
marginal cost 1/z. Note that this is similar to that in Melitz (2003); with labor as the only input
of production, pd(z) = 1ρz . Now we can rewrite the firm’s value function as follows
V
d(n, z) = Aσzσ−1
[
(1− 1/σ)
δ + r
]σ−1 1
σ
+ (1 + r)
(
n− fd
)
(17)
Notice that for these firms, kd(z), Rd(z), and V d(n, z) are strictly increasing while pd(z) is strictly
decreasing in z.
Exporting Firms: Similarly, let kx(z), pd(z), pf (z), Rx(z), and V x(n, z) denote the corre-
sponding unconstrained production level, prices that exporting firm charges in the domestic and for-
eign markets, the sales revenue and the value of the firm, respectively. Then V x(n, z) = pix(n, z) =
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max
k≥0
Rx(k, z) + (1 − δ)max{k − fd − fx, 0} − (1 + r)k + (1 + r)n and kx(z) ≡ argmax
k≥0
V
x(n; z).
Using the sales revenue function for the symmetric two-country case (8), exporting firms requires
the scale of operation that is larger than those non-exporting counterparts and in particular
k
x(z) = 2
[
A (1− 1/σ) z1−1/σ
δ + r
]σ
+ fd + fx > kd(z) (18)
Similar to the case of non-exporting firms, the level of production is increasing with productivity
while the curvature depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution σ. Moreover, in the
symmetric case due to the absence of transactional costs of exporting, exporting firms will charge
the same price in the domestic and the foreign market. Since in this case the firm supplies equal
units of its product in both markets yx = yd = 12y, here we have the price function
pd(z) = pf (z) =
δ + r
(1− 1/σ) z or
δ + r
ρz
(19)
Thus, the sales revenue function and the value function of an exporting firm are as follows
R
x(z) = 2
[
Az1−1/σ
]σ [1− 1σ
δ + r
]σ−1
> R
d(z) (20)
V
x(n, z) = 2Aσzσ−1
[
(1− 1/σ)
δ + r
]σ−1 1
σ
+ (1 + r)
(
n− fd − fx
)
(21)
To prove that given Assumptions 2-4, there are three groups of firms in equilibrium: those that
do not operate, those that only serve the domestic market, and those that do export, we do it in
three steps. First suppose that in equilibrium, there are two cutoffs of productivity zm < zFB <
zFB <∞ such that for z ≥ zFB, V d(n; z) ≥ (1+ r)n; and for z ≥ zFB, V x(n; z) ≥ V d(n; z). Then,
we solve for corresponding aggregate variables (I and P ). In equilibrium, the aggregate variables
must be consistent with the individual firms’ behaviors. The last step is to verify that the cutoffs
satisfy the assumed properties.
From the derivation above V d(n, z) ≥ (1+r)n if and only if Aσzσ−1
[
(1−1/σ)
δ+r
]σ−1
1
σ−(1+r)fd ≥
0. Therefore, we have the cutoff of operating zFB to satisfy
zFB =
[
(1 + r)fd
1
σA
σ
]1/(σ−1) [
δ + r
1− 1σ
]
(22)
Similarly, to find zFB, we have V x(n, z) ≥ V d(n, z) if and only if Aσzσ−1c(σ, δ, r)− (1 + r)fx > 0.
Thus, it must be the case that
zFB =
[
(1 + r)fx
1
σA
σ
]1/(σ−1) [
δ + r
1− 1σ
]
(23)
and by Assumption 4 we have zFB < zFB. Next, we solve for the aggregate variables which must
be consistent with the individual firms’ behaviors. Due to the structure of our model, this can be
done by solving everything in terms the variable A defined earlier. In particular,
A =
(
I
P
)1/σ
P = I1/σP 1−1/σ
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The aggregate income I consists of the income from the three types of firms
It =
∫
n
zFB∫
zm
(1 + r)ng(z)g(n)dzdn+
∫
n
zFB∫
zFB
V
d(n, z)g(z)g(n)dzdn (24)
+
∫
n
∫
zFB
V
x(n, z)g(z)g(n)dzdn
where it can be shown that the aggregate income of the non-operating firms
∫
n
zFB∫
zm
(1 + r)ng(z)g(n)dzdn = (1 + r)
[
γnm
γ − 1
] [
1−
(
zm
zFB
)γ]
while the aggregate income of the non-exporting firms
∫
n
zFB∫
zFB
V
d(n, z)g(z)g(n)dzdn =
[
1− 1/σ
δ + r
]σ−1 1
σA
σγzγm
σ − γ − 1
[(
zFB
)σ−γ−1 − (zFB)σ−γ−1]
−(1 + r)
[( zm
zFB
)γ − ( zm
zFB
)γ] [ γnm
γ − 1 − f
d
]
and by Assumption 2 the aggregate income of the exporting firms is finite and is given by∫
n
∫
zFB
V
x(n, z)g(z)g(n)dzdn = (1 + r)
( zm
zFB
)γ [ γnm
γ − 1 − f
d − fx
]
−2
[
1− 1/σ
δ + r
]σ−1 1
σA
σγzγm
σ − γ − 1
(
zFB
)σ−γ−1
Together this implies that the aggregate income of all firms in each country is
I = (1 + r)
[
γnm
γ − 1 −
(
zm
zFB
)γ
fd −
( zm
zFB
)γ
fx
]
(25)
−
[
1− 1/σ
δ + r
]σ−1 1
σA
σγzγm
σ − γ − 1
[(
zFB
)σ−γ−1
+
(
zFB
)σ−γ−1]
The aggregate price P consists of prices of firms that supply their goods to the market, including
both domestic and foreign firms. Since we have symmetric countries
P =
∫
n
zFB∫
zFB
pd(z)1−σg(z)g(n)dzdn+
∫
n
∫
zFB
pd(z)1−σg(z)g(n)dzdn
+
∫
n
∫
zFB
pf (z)1−σg(z)g(n)dzdn

1
1−σ
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where
∫
n
zFB∫
zFB
pd(z)1−σg(z)g(n)dzdn =
[
δ + r
1− 1/σ
]1−σ γzγm
σ − γ − 1
[(
zFB
)σ−γ−1 − (zFB)σ−γ−1]
and
∫
n
∫
zFB
pd(z)1−σg(z)g(n)dzdn =
∫
n
∫
zFB
pf (z)1−σg(z)g(n)dzdn
=
[
δ + r
1− 1/σ
]1−σ γzγm
1− σ + γ
(
zFB
)σ−γ−1
Thus, we have
P =
[[
δ + r
(1− 1/σ)
]1−σ γzγm
1− σ + γ
[(
zFB
)σ−γ−1
+
(
zFB
)σ−γ−1]] 11−σ
(26)
Using (25) and (26) along with (22) and (23) in the definition of A, we have
A = σ1/σ
{[
1−
[
1− 1/σ
γ
]]
×
[
δ+r
1−1/σ
]−γ
γzγm
1−σ+γ
[[
fd
](σ−γ−1)/(σ−1) + [fx](σ−γ−1)/(σ−1)] (1 + r)−γ/(σ−1)
N

−(σ−1)
γσ
Then, substitute this into the (22) and (23) we have the cutoffs value stated in Proposition 1 and
Assumption 3 will guarantee that zm < zFB. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1
Let νd be the lagrange multiplier on the feasibility constraint and λd be the lagrange multiplier on
the borrowing constraint. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution to the the
constrained maximization problem are
Rd1(i+ b, z) + (1− δ)− (1 + r)− νd ≤ 0, i ≥ 0 (27)
Rd1(i+ b, z) + (1− δ)− (1 + r)− λd ≤ 0, b ≥ 0 (28)
νd [n− i] = 0, νd ≥ 0 (29)
λd [ηn− b] = 0, λd ≥ 0 (30)
We prove by ruling out different cases to arrive at the solution that domestic firms with z > z
such that 0 < id(n; z) + bd(n, z) < kd(z), must have both id(n, z) > 0 and bd(n, z) > 0. Thus, in
this case both constraints must be binding i.e. id(n, z) = n and bd(n, z) = ηn and, as a result,
the level of production is kd(n, z) = (1 + η)n. Since kd(n, z) < kd(z), this is the case where n
< k
d
(z)
(1+η) . Using similar technique, we can also show that for those firms such that z > z with
0 < ix(n, z) + bx(n, z) < kx(z), both constraints will be binding as well. Thus, these are the firms
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with kx(n, z) = (1+η)n < kx(z), and n < k
x
(z)
(1+η) . In other words, with n ≥ k
d
(z)
(1+η) , domestic firms can
attain the unconstrained scale of production kd(n, z) = kd(z) while exporting firms with n ≥ k
x
(z)
(1+η) ,
will be unconstrained and can finance kx(n, z) = kx(z). Thus, for constrained domestic firms with
n ∈ [nd(z), nd(z)), we have pid(n; z) = Rd((1 + η)n, z)+(1−δ) [(1 + η)n− fd]− (1+r) (1 + η)n+
(1+r)n. Given this functional form, pid1(n; z) = (1 + η)
[
Rd1((1 + η)n, z) + (1− δ)− (1 + r)
]
+(1+r)
and pid11(n; z) = (1 + η)
2Rd11((1 + η)n). Since k
d(n, z) < kd(z), Rd1((1 + η)n, z)+(1−δ)−(1+r) > 0
and, thus, pid1(n, z) > 0 while by the properties of the revenue function in (5) pi
d
11(n, z) < 0. Now,
we have established that the return to net worth accumulation of a constrained firm is higher than
the return from the risk-free assets and this return is decreasing and approaching (1+ r) as the net
worth approaches nd(z). On the contrary for n ≥ nd(z), pid(n; z) is strictly increasing and linear in
n and, in particular, pid1(n; z) = (1 + r). Similar proof can be used to show that similar properties
hold for the case of exporting firms. In particular, for firms with n ∈ [nx(z), nx(z)) and z ≥ z,
we have pix(n; z) = Rx((1 + η)n, z) + (1 − δ) [(1 + η)n− fd − fx] − (1 + r) (1 + η)n + (1 + r)n
and, thus, pix1 (n; z) = (1 + η) [R
x
1((1 + η)n, z) + (1− δ)− (1 + r)] + (1 + r) > (1 + r) > 0 and
pix11(n; z) = (1 + η)
2Rx11((1 + η)n) < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
In the proof of Lemma 1, we have k
d
(z)
(1+η) and
k
x
(z)
(1+η) defining the minimum level of net worth such
that domestic and exporting firms will not be constrained. This gives the value of the two cutoffs
nd(z) and nx(z). Since kx(z) > kd(z) and both are strictly increasing in z as shown in the proof of
Proposition 1, we have nx(z) > nd(z) for all firms with z > z and both increasing in z as well. The
curvature of kx(z) and kd(z) also implies the curvature of nx(z) and nd(z) and as shown earlier, it
depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution σ. Before proving part (ii), first it is important
to note that firms never operate if the maximum amount capital they can finance (1 + η)n cannot
cover the fixed costs of operating fd. Thus, those firms with n < f
d
1+η will obviously never operate
and this implies a lower bounded of the net worth necessary for firms to find operating profitable.
Let W d(i + b, z) = Rd(i + b, z) + (1 − δ)max{i+ b− fd, 0} − (1 + r)(i + b). Then, by the
definition of the optimal level of production kd(z), W d1 (k
d(z), z) = Rd1(k
d(z), z)− (δ+r) = 0. Thus,
for the case of the financially constrained domestic firms, i.e. those with id(n, z) + bd(n, z) < kd(z)
and kd(z) > 0, we have W d1 (i+ b, z) > 0 and pi
d
1(n, z) =W
d
1 ((1 + η)n, z)(1 + η) + (1 + r) > (1 + r).
Since for fd ≤ k ≤ kd(z), W d(k, z) is continuous and strictly increasing in k, negative at
k = fd, and positive at k = kd(z) for z > z, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is a level
of production kd(z) > fd and kd(z) < kd(z) such that W d(kd(z), z) = 0. This also implies that
W d(k, z) > 0 for k > kd(z). Note that for z = z, kd(z) and kd(z) coincide. For those z where
kd(z) < kd(z), the level of production of a constrained firm kd(z) = (1 + η)nd(z) where nd(z) solves
Rd((1 + η)nd(z), z) + (1− δ)
[
(1 + η)nd(z)− fd
]
− (1 + r) (1 + η)nd(z) = 0. (31)
Differentiating (31) with respect to z, we have
∂nd(z)
∂z
=
−Rd2((1 + η)nd(z), z)
(1 + η)W d1 ((1 + η)nd(z), z)
< 0
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which from (5), the numerator is negative while the denominator is positive as (1 + η)nd(z) <
k
d(z). Therefore, we have ∂n
d(z)
∂z < 0. Differentiating with respect to z further we have
∂2nd(z)
∂z2
= −(1 + η)W d1 ((1 + η)nd(z), z)×[
Rd21((1 + η)n
d(z), z) (1 + η) ∂n
d(z)
∂z +R
d
22(1 + η)n
d(z), z)
]
[
(1 + η)W d1 ((1 + η)nd(z), z)
]2
+Rd2((1 + η)n
d(z), z)(1 + η)×[
W d11((1 + η)n
d(z), z)(1 + η)∂n
d(z)
∂z +W
d
12((1 + η)n
d(z), z)
]
[
(1 + η)W d1 ((1 + η)nd(z), z)
]2
A = σ1/σ
{[
1−
[
1− 1/σ
γ
]]
×
[
δ+r
1−1/σ
]−γ
γzγm
1−σ+γ
[[
fd
](σ−γ−1)/(σ−1) + [fx](σ−γ−1)/(σ−1)] (1 + r)−γ/(σ−1)
N

−(σ−1)
γσ
SinceW d11((1 + η)n
d(z), z) =Rd11((1 + η)n
d(z), z)< 0 andW d12((1 + η)n
d(z), z) =Rd12((1 + η)n
d(z), z)
> 0, we can establish that
∂2nd(z)
∂z2
= − [(+) (−) + (−)] (+)
(+)
+
(+) [(−) (−) + (+)]
(+)
> 0
Thus, the threshold nd(z) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in z.
Let W x(i+ b, z) = Rx(i+ b, z) + (1− δ)max{i+ b− fd − fx, 0}− (1 + r)(i+ b). Then, using
similar arguments to the case of domestic firms, we have W x1 (k
x(z), z) = Rx1(k
x(z), z)− (δ+ r) = 0
while for the financially constrained exporting firms, we have W x1 (i + b, z) > 0 and, in particular
pix1 (n, z) = W
x
1 ((1 + η)n, z)(1 + η) + (1 + r) > (1 + r). To prove part (iv), note that the level of
net worth nx(z) must satisfy the condition W d(kd(n, z), z) = W x((1 + η)n, z). Since Rx(k, z) is
more sensitive to z than Rd(k, z), this is also true for the functions W x(k, z) and W d(k, z). Thus,
an increase in z will lead to a strictly higher increase in W x(k, z) than W d(k, z) for each k. This
implies that the threshold nx(z) must be strictly decreasing in z. Q.E.D.
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Appendix 3.B: Computational Algorithm
Given r = 1/β − 1,
• Guess I0, P0, V0(n, z; I0, P0, r) and G0(n, z; I0, P0, r).
• Solve for both the firm’s static and dynamic policy functions χd(n, z; I0, P0, r),
χx(n, z; I0, P0, r), id(n, z; I0, P0, r), ix(n, z; I0, P0, r), bd(n, z; I0, P0, r), bx(n, z; I0, P0, r), and
n′(n, z; I0, P0, r).
• Iterate on the value function until convergence V∞(n, z; I0, P0, r).
• Update the aggregate variables Ik, Pk, and the distribution of firms Gk(n, z) that are consis-
tent with the individual firms’ decisions and the firm exit and entry transition.
• Repeat the above until convergence.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Final Dataset
Brazil Chile
Year of the Data 2002 2003
Sample Size 1365 650
Mean Age (years) 18.0 30.4
(%) Total Market Value of Production/ GDP 2.7% n.a.
(%) Total Sales/ GDP 2.3% 3.7%
(%) Exporters 16.0% 27.1%
(%) Loans requiring collateral 67.4% 68.5%
Value of collateral needed for a loan (% of the loan amount) 123.1% 112.6%
Mean Age Started Exporting (years) 15.2 14.1
Table 2: Access to Finance as Constraints to Investment
Brazil: Business constraint: access to finance (e.g. collateral) Freq. Percent
No obstacle 198 14.7
Minor obstacle 118 8.8
Moderate obstacle 230 17.1
Major obstacle 341 25.3
Very Severe Obstacle 459 34.1
Total 1346 100.0
Chile: Business constraint: access to finance (e.g. collateral) Freq. Percent
No obstacle 396 61.3
Minor obstacle 43 6.7
Moderate obstacle 73 11.3
Major obstacle 70 10.8
Very Severe Obstacle 64 9.9
Total 646 100.0
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Table 3: Costs of Finance as Constraints to Investment
Brazil: Business constraint: costs of finance (e.g. interest rates) Freq. Percent
No obstacle 74 5.5
Minor obstacle 45 3.3
Moderate obstacle 108 8.0
Major obstacle 362 26.8
Very Severe Obstacle 761 56.4
Total 1350 100.0
Chile: Business constraint: costs of finance (e.g. interest rates) Freq. Percent
No obstacle 378 58.3
Minor obstacle 54 8.3
Moderate obstacle 107 16.5
Major obstacle 64 9.9
Very Severe Obstacle 45 7.0
Total 648 100.0
Table 4: Mean Age to Start Exporting (Years)
Brazil Chile
Overall 15.24 14.05
Firms with highest two-quintiles of net worth 9.17 10.69
Firms with lowest two-quintiles of net worth 16.43 15.92
Firms reported access to finance as no or minor obstacle 14.16 13.65
Firms reported access to finance as major or severe obstacle 16.14 18.94
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Figure 1: Brazil’s Ratios of Exporters: Asset Productivity and Net Worth
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Figure 3: Brazil’s Ratios of Exporters: Labor Productivity and Net Worth
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Figure 5: Brazil’s Ratios of Exporters: Asset Productivity and Access to Finance
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Figure 6: Chile’s Ratios of Exporters: Asset Productivity and Access to Finance
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Figure 7: Brazil’s Ratios of Exporters: Labor Productivity and Access to Finance
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
1 2 3 4 5
Labor Productivity (5-quintiles)
R
a t
i o
s  
o f
 E
x p
o r
t e
r s
Access to finance: no 
and minor obstacle
Access to finance: major 
and very severe obstacle
Figure 8: Chile’s Ratios of Exporters: Labor Productivity and Access to Finance
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Figure 9: Firms’ Decision Rules with Borrowing Constraints, σ > 2.
 
 
If the productivity cutoffs (z and z) are binding, there are five groups of firms in equilibrium:
non-operating firms, unconstrained and constrained non-exporting firms, and unconstrained and
constrained exporting firms. Note that these productivity cutoffs (z and z) may be different from
the corresponding unconstrained first-best levels (zFB and zFB).
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Figure 10: Numerical Results: Firms’ Entry and Exporting Decision Rules
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Figure 11: Numerical Results: Firms’ Decision Rules
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Figure 12: Firms’ End-of-Period Net Worth and Dividends Policies
a)η = 3 (benchmark)
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Figure 13: Firms’ End-of-Period Net Worth (Saving Policy Function) over (n, z)
a)η = 3 (benchmark)
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Figure 14: Saving Policy: Poverty Trap
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